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ARTICLE

Philosophy at the Service of History
Marx and the Need for Critical Philosophy Today
JEFFREY NOONAN

Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada

Abstract
Marx is famous for apparently dismissing the practical role of philosophy. Yet, as
accumulating empirical knowledge of growing life-crises proves, the simply availability
of facts is insufficient to motivate struggles for fundamental change. So too manifest
social crisis. The economic crisis which began in 2008 has indeed motivated social
struggles, but nothing on the order of the revolutionary struggles Marx expected.
Rather than make Marx irrelevant, however, the absence of global struggles for truly
radical change make his early engagement with the role of philosophy more important
than ever. This engagement suggests a conception of philosophy as a uniquely practical
discipline distinguished from empirical science by its unique capacity to synthesise
values from the facts of life. The article examines the development of this conception
of philosophy in Marx’s early work and concludes with the outlines for a new critical
philosophy capable of generating a new set of universal values necessary to motivate
anti-capitalist struggles today.
Résumé
Si Hegel a raison et que la philosophie émerge toujours dans un monde social dans
lequel les contradictions se sont fossilisées, où le pouvoir d'unification semble avoir
disparu, alors notre monde est un monde qui a besoin de la philosophie. L’automne
2008 a été témoin du début d'une crise économique qui promet d’être la pire de sa
génération. La crise économique est liée à une crise politique de la démocratie sur le
long terme (même si la crise n’est pas typiquement reconnue comme telle),
caractérisée à travers le monde par un retrait de la régulation de l’activité économique
par l’Etat et (sous le prétexte de la ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’) l’hyperrégulation des
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vies publiques et privées des citoyens. Les crises économiques et politiques sont toutes
deux enserrées dans une profonde crise environnementale provoquée par la croissance
hypertrophiée de l’économie capitaliste dirigée par l’argent-comme-valeur. Si cette
valeur est en crise parce qu’elle ne peut plus ‘unifier’ le monde social (elle est
maintenant la cause et non pas la solution des problèmes fondamentaux de la vie
humaine) alors la philosophie, si Hegel a raison, devrait être conviée en tant qu'unique
pratique intellectuelle capable de générer une nouvelle synthèse sur la base des
nouvelles valeurs (ou au moins une nouvelle articulation des anciennes valeurs).
Keywords
• philosophy • life-value • life-requirements • capitalism • social criticism
Mots clés
• philosophie • valeur-de-vie • besoins vitaux • capitalisme • critique sociale
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If Hegel is correct and philosophy always appears in a social world whose
contradictions have become ossified, where it appears that the ‘power of
unification’ has been lost, then ours is a world in need of philosophy (Hegel
1978, 12). Autumn 2008 witnessed the onset of an economic crisis that
promises to be the worst in at least a generation. The economic crisis was
related to a longer term political crisis of democracy (although this crisis is
usually not named as such) characterised across the globe by a
simultaneous withdrawal of state regulation of economic activity and
(under the cover of the ‘War on Terror’) hyper-regulation of citizens’
public and private lives. Both the economic and the political crisis are
wrapped inside a deeper environmental crisis caused by the hypertrophied
growth of the money-value steered capitalist economy. The longer-term
threat to life and human life posed by the environmental crisis has recently
been sidelined by politicians in full panic mode grasping for Keynesian
mechanisms to restart the disrupted pattern of ever higher rates of
commodity consumption, even though those rates of consumption, and the
energy use they require, are at the root of the environmental crisis. The
overall structure of the crisis, however, is neither environmental, nor
economic, nor political, but normative. By ‘normative’ I mean that the
crisis is generated by the steering value of contemporary liberaldemocratic-capitalist society. That steering value is the increase of money
wealth understood not only as an economic ‘necessity’ but also the social
condition of individual ‘choice’ and the essence of good human lives. If this
value-system is in crisis because it can no longer ‘unify’ the social world
then philosophy, if Hegel is correct, ought to be called forth to generate a
new synthesis of values.
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Where, however, is philosophy? This question is not new but has
been posed repeatedly in the history of philosophy. In terms most relevant
for the present argument it was posed by Max Horkheimer in the early
1930s. Horkheimer was turning the Institute for Social Research in a new
direction to enable it to understand the social and economic changes at the
root of monopoly capitalism and mass culture. Like Horkheimer, I am
interested in defending a conception of philosophy ‘as a theoretical
undertaking oriented to the general, the ‘essential’ ... capable of giving
particular studies animating impulses’(Horkeimer 1993, 9). That which I
take as ‘essential’ to philosophy is its unique capacity for synthesising
values out of the facts of life. The Frankfurt School articulated some of the
most sophisticated and important criticisms of twentieth century liberalcapitalist society, but conditions today are not the conditions of the 1930s
or even the 1960s. Hence a new explanation of what it means to interpret
philosophy as a value-synthesising discipline is required.
There is no doubt that many philosophers from many different
philosophical traditions have engaged themselves with different
dimensions of the normative problems underlying the global crisis. Yet, if
we judge their efforts from the standpoint of civil society, the informal
sphere of free association of which liberal and republican philosophers
have been so enamoured over the past two decades, these efforts have
been in vain. Philosophical interventions into the crisis have almost no
public standing. Rare is the case where a philosopher appears on CNN,
writes for the New York Times, is invited to non-academic conferences
where concrete solutions to concrete problems are discussed, or even
comes up in political conversation between citizens over a coffee or a beer.
The public absence of philosophy is a sign that philosophy too faces a
crisis, one whose timing could not be worse given the present world’s need
for philosophy. This crisis was first announced by Jean-Francois Lyotard
more than two decades ago. ‘Speculative or humanistic philosophy is
forced to relinquish its legitimation duties, which explains why philosophy
is facing a crisis wherever it persists in arrogating such functions and is
reduced to the study of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has
been realistic enough to surrender them’ (Lyotard 1984, 41).
There are exceptions, of course, the most important of which is
perhaps Alain Badiou. Badiou directly confronts this crisis in Manifesto for
Philosophy, but his response perhaps exemplifies rather than solves it
(Badiou 1999). Badiou’s ethical work, while it affirms a universal
conception of the human good, rigidly distinguishes the good from our
‘animal’ embodied nature. His ethic of truths is divorced from all
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connection to the fundamental requirements of human life. Truths are true
just because people affirm them as true and persist in this affirmation
against all opposition (Badiou 2001, 58; Badiou 2005, 202-208, 231-239,
331-343). Yet what is at stake in the present crisis of values is precisely the
natural and social foundations of human life-support, the ‘animal’
precondition for commitment to truths whatever the content of those
commitments might be. A philosophical response to this crisis that is
worthy of the dignity of philosophy must articulate a new philosophical
synthesis of the values that express humanity’s intrinsic dependence on
the natural world and our interdependence with others in the social world.
It must do so because those are the values whose loss or suppression are at
the root of the crisis of life-value today.
My argument will not explicate or defend the content of the new
life-values that our world stands in need of today. I have defended what I
take these values to be in many other places over the past several years
(Noonan 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b). My focus here, rather, will be on
philosophy itself, and in particular its being an essentially practical
discipline uniquely structured to produce and defend a new value
synthesis by a process of generalization of the ‘facts of life.’ Knowledge of
these facts of life is supplied to philosophy, at least in part, by empirical
disciplines. While this is a similar programmatic aim to that defended by
Horkheimer, my historical touchstone lays behind the Frankfurt School in
the work of Marx. Some, many Marxists included, will find this choice
ironic given that Marx apparently rejected the practical nature of
philosophy. Yet, Marx is the best historical platform from which to
construct my argument. Marx was a philosopher that struggled repeatedly
against philosophy. He was constantly tempted in his later work by what
he took to be the methods of natural science, but was unable to free his
work from the values first synthesised philosophically in his early work.
Marx’s body of work is famously huge, and I will not attempt a complete
exegesis of even this thread of argument. Instead, I will focus for the most
part on the period from 1843 to 1845 in which his self-conscious struggle
within and against philosophy was most acute. Out of this struggle
emerges a unique conception (or so I will argue) of the practical relevance
of philosophy as a value synthesising discipline. In the second section I will
generalise Marx’s insights into a defence of philosophy today as the
necessary condition for a new synthesis of life-values. These life-values
must underlie, in some form, any possible solution to contemporary lifecrisis which is neither authoritarian nor regressive.
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History, Philosophy, Values and the Future
The Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach is generally interpreted as Marx’s final
repudiation of philosophy in favour of empirical social criticism and
revolutionary practice. His words are terse and his meaning apparently
unambiguous: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in
different ways. The point, however, is to change it’ (Suchting 1979, 24).
However, if we set this aphorism in the context of his reflections on the
practice of philosophy that led up to this apparently ultimate break with
the discipline, ambiguity does indeed emerge.
Marx’s earliest systematic thoughts on the status of philosophy in
relation to empirical disciplines like history are scattered throughout his
early criticisms of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and in letters to Feuerbach
and Arnold Ruge. When these thoughts are read in the political context in
which Marx was working, it becomes clear, I believe, that Marx understood
philosophy in two distinct ways. The first is as a discipline which
synthesises values out of empirical knowledge of certain basic facts of life.
The second is as an abstract discipline which holds itself above the fray of
human struggles for a better life. In order to understand this difference,
and the contemporary significance of the first conception, it is essential to
keep in mind two elements of Marx’s political context. First is the
contradiction, remarked upon by all progressive German intellectuals of
the time, between the economic and political ‘backwardness’ of Germany
and its ‘advanced’ philosophical culture. Second is the Young Hegelian
understanding of the function of philosophy.
It was a staple of German progressive politics in the early 1840s
that philosophy would have to play an outsized role in the emancipation of
Germany from its backward social and political conditions (Kouvelakis
2003, 235). Since German industrial development lagged behind England,
it could not look to a powerful working class to lead progressive struggles.
Furthermore, since Germany had not undergone a classic ‘bourgeois’
revolution as had France, its national political consciousness was also
underdeveloped. Hence intellectuals would have to play a more profound
mediating role than in either England or France. In other words, young
German radicals argued that the very social backwardness of Germany
enabled German intellectuals to develop a richer understanding of human
emancipation because their thinking was not dominated by the need to
first construct and manage a liberal-capitalist society. German
philosophers could prepare the future in theory, and had only to await the
inevitable development of the social forces necessary to realize the idea.
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‘The only practically possible liberation of Germany,’ Marx wrote, ‘is the
liberation that proceeds from the standpoint of the theory [Feuerbach’s]
which proclaims man to be the highest being for man’(Marx 1975a, 187).
As is evident, at this point Marx does not conceive philosophy as
‘only’ an interpretation of the world. He understands philosophy as the
intellectual discipline that identifies and proclaims the universal value
foundation for truly revolutionary political change. That universal value
foundation is a materialist understanding of human nature, an
understanding which, as we will see, emphasises both humanity’s
dependence on physical nature and interdependence with each other in
social relationships (especially economic and political relationships). The
German revolution will be the most radical precisely because it rests on a
deeper value foundation than was possible in France and England, because
French and English revolutionaries had to fight both for and against liberal
values. These values obscured from their understanding the deepest
contradictions between capitalism and human freedom. These
contradictions themselves, Marx argued, stemmed from the alienation that
capitalism imposes between the human collectivity and nature and
between human individuals locked in zero-sum competitive social
relationships.
Since there was no revolutionary bourgeoisie in Germany,
philosophers were able to grasp in mind what capitalist social dynamics
denied in material reality. The importance of this mediating role is what
concerns me most. For Marx philosophy is framed but not determined by
the past and present. Instead its systematic impulse towards universality
pushes it beneath immediate contradictions in search of the ultimate
foundations of human social life. These ultimate foundations, the most
basic facts of life, then function as the material out of which philosophy can
synthesise universal values and posit these as the normative foundation of
a free social order to be constructed in the future.
It is this understanding of universal values as embedded in the
fundamental facts of natural and social life that distinguishes Marx’s
conception of philosophy from his Young Hegelian contemporaries.
Beneath the class identities of the groups contending for power and
legitimacy lies the humanity of the combatants. It is only when philosophy
understands this humanity that it can become properly radical. History,
which Marx uses as a portmanteau term for all manner of empirical
enquiries into the structure of human life, explicates the particular
structure of the facts of life as they change across social space and time.
Three general facts are crucial: our dependence on nature, our social need
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to produce what our lives require, and the general capability to do so as
agents, or the fundamental form of human freedom this productive agency
encodes. ‘The task of history,’ he writes, ‘is to establish the truth of this
world. The task of philosophy, which is at the service of history, is to
unmask estrangement in its unholy forms’ (Marx 1975a, 176). History
establishes the truth of the given social world by comprehending the
interaction between material forces and human struggles that have
produced the different forms of human society. This is an essentially
empirical task. In these early writings, however, Marx does not assume, as
he later would, that the future can be known on the basis of understanding
the laws of the present ‘with the precision of a natural science’ (Marx 1970,
21). Instead, the future is not an object of knowledge but a potential site
for conscious self-creation. The possibility of self-creation, however,
presupposes definite normative goals. Philosophy renders itself practical
by synthesising these goals out of the raw material supplied by the
empirical study of the ‘unholy forms’ of alienation. In the absence of
philosophy all one has are certain facts of life. Since philosophy by its very
nature concerns itself with the meaning of the facts of life, it is able to
synthesise universal values out of what would remain, in the absence of a
specifically philosophical intervention, mere facts. The process here is
analogous to the action of a chemist creating a new compound. The raw
materials for the compound are present in the elements that compose it,
but the compound itself requires something not contained in the different
molecular structures. It requires the creative thought of the chemist who
can see how they can be fit together in ways that do not appear in nature.
Likewise, meaning, the basic condition of there being values, is not present
in the raw facts of life as facts of life, but must be supplied by a
philosophical intervention.
Unmasking estrangement in its unholy forms cannot be an act of
empirical criticism alone. For in unmasking estrangement, one is doing
more than saying what human beings are, one is saying what human beings
ought to become through a collective political project. If establishing the
empirical truth of this world were sufficient to overcome it, then anytime
one observes social problems one should also observe widespread
movements to solve them. By including a statement of philosophy’s task,
however, Marx at least implies that universal values must be synthesised
out of these facts as the necessary condition of motivating political change.
If the truth of the world can be established by history, without that truth
being in and of itself sufficient to motivate the process of political
revolution, then philosophy, which deals with the ought-to-become, is an
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irreducible practical contribution to the process of political change. For
any empirical discipline ruling values (the values of self-estrangement) can
only be given, historically contingent facts. The values that will organize
the future, however, cannot be treated simply as facts, because the social
reality in which they could circulate as facts does not yet exist. The values
of the future exist as suppressed potentialities whose superior value
cannot be proven by empirical arguments, since the data to support the
empirical claims does not exist. Thus, only normative arguments rooted in,
but not reducible to, facts about human nature and how it is affected by
given social formations can play the required role. At the same time,
philosophy does not preach from on high about mere aspirations or ideas.
It is at the service of history. The values of the future that it defends are
possibilities that history has disclosed, but which the present structure of
society cannot realize. The values of the future are not mere oughts, (as
Marx dismissed Kant’s Categorical Imperative) but oughts-to-become
which motivate because they respond to real life-crises felt in the present.
The realizability of these values can plausibly be established by reference
to what can be known from history about human potentiality (Marx 1976,
210-211).
A philosophy at the service of history does not thereby invent
values ex nihilo. ‘We do not confront the world dogmatically with a new
principle... we develop for the world new principles out of the principles of
this world’ (Marx 1979a, 32). In other words, the values of the world that
ought-to-become are produced by human historical activity, but can reach
the fullness of their development, expression, and enjoyment only in a
different social world. This social world cannot come to be without
conscious effort, and conscious effort that would produce a new social
world must be steered by universal, truly human values. Connecting past
and future is human activity; separating present from future are the
institutions of the given society. Marx is clear that these potentially ruling
values cannot triumph simply as automatic results of the forces of history.
‘It is not enough for thought to strive towards realization, reality itself
must strive towards thought’ (Marx 1975a, 183). This claim is far different
from claiming, as Marx later would, that periods of crisis are the inevitable
result of a contradiction between the forces and relations of production
(Marx and Engels 1986, 39-40). That contradiction might generate social
crisis, but revolution, to be successful, must also strive towards thought. In
other words, there must be a conscious normative goal to motivate people
to respond to the crisis in a revolutionary rather than a reformist way.
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Philosophy is thus a practical discipline for Marx to the extent that it
clarifies the values according to which reality ought to strive.
This essential point is supported by contrasting it with a different
conception of philosophy to which Marx was, and remained, hostile. This
conception of philosophy dominated the Young Hegelian movement from
which Marx was struggling to differentiate himself (Breckman 1999). The
Young Hegelian understanding of philosophical practice was exemplified
for Marx in the work of Bruno Bauer. For Bauer, the relationship between
history and philosophy is the converse of that posited by Marx. Rather
than philosophy being at the service of history, history is meaningful only
in so far as it serves as the substance for philosophical interpretation.
Moreover, the goal of this interpretation is not to derive from history the
values that will lead radical political movements, but rather to disclose the
unbridgeable chasm between philosophical ideals and historical
development. As Bauer wrote, ‘the critic participates neither in the
sufferings nor the joys of society; he knows neither friendship nor love,
neither hatred nor envy; he reigns in solitude, where now and then the
laughter of the Olympian gods over the perversity of the world rings from
his lips’ (Marx 1979b, 36). For Bauer, therefore, philosophy is essentially
contextless and timeless. Its role is not to ‘strive towards reality’ but to
demonstrate that no matter how far human striving goes, it can never
attain the Olympian heights of speculative criticism. Its relationship to
history is therefore entirely negative. It can learn nothing from history, but
nor, as a consequence, can it teach anyone anything of practical value. As
Bauer says, the critic reigns in solitude, above the swirl of events and the
mundane joys and sufferings of ordinary people. Bauer’s perspective is the
purity of the Beautiful Soul of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit who dares
not act for fear of burdening his principles with the unpredictability of
consequences (Hegel 1987, 383-409).
Marx, however, demands action, but not normatively blind action.
Collective struggles must serve general yet definite values synthesised out
of those aspects of the facts of life which are meaningful because they are
requirements of human life and free human activity. What are the most
salient facts? To uncover these it is necessary to examine in general Marx’s
understanding of how the relationships between human beings and nature
and between human beings and each other become alienated under
capitalist social relationships. Three facts are essential: Human beings
cannot live apart from on-going interactions with the natural world. ‘The
life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the
fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature’ (Marx 1975b, 275).
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As John Bellamy Foster demonstrates in exquisite textual detail, it is the
primacy of this connection between humanity and the natural world that
underlies Marx’s entire critique of capitalism. He argues that ‘alienation
from the natural world is the fundamental form of human
alienation’(Foster 2000, 174). Second, human beings do not live ready to
hand on what they find in nature but together in societies which
cooperatively produce that which each and all require to live. ‘Thus the
social character is the general character of the whole movement: just as
society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. Activity
and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are
social’ (Marx 1979b, 298). Finally, and as a consequence of the first two
points, human freedom is at first a fact of the productive nature of human
beings. Freedom is not created in the first instance by political forms or
legal structures, but is essentially the power of human beings to
consciously produce their conditions of existence. This production has
both a biological and a social dimension. Production both maintains
human life and creates the meaningful forms through which human beings
interpret their world and find their own purposes within it. As Marx says,
‘the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The
whole character of a species ... is contained in the character of its lifeactivity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character’ (Marx
1979b, 276). These facts are transhistorical constants of human life. Yet,
read philosophically, from the standpoint of why they matter to human life,
they permit the synthesis of definite universal values that can then guide
the development of the world that ought-to-become.
What explains the move from a mere description of general facts to
the philosophical synthesis of the values they contain? This crucial move is
what Horkheimer, for example, does not explain. The movement is
generated by the way in which specific structures of a given society can
contradict the general facts of human life. While some philosophers may
object that contradictions can only hold between propositions, this view is
overly narrow. Specific social structures can contradict the general facts of
life when those specific structures prevent people from satisfying their liferequirements, even though the essential purpose of society is to enable
people to satisfy those requirements. Take for example the most general
fact of human life, its dependence on the natural system of life-support.
Human labour transforms the natural world in order to provide the goods
necessary to sustain life. In capitalism, by contrast, life becomes
dependent upon labour and commodity markets; money becomes a
condition of acquiring the goods that we need to live. People can therefore
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suffer harm, not because resources in general are lacking, but because
people lack paid work and therefore the money required to purchase
needed resources. In this way the specific structure of capitalist markets
contradicts the general fact of the human need for certain resources to
keep themselves alive. People are intelligent and can recognize this
contradiction. When they do they construct normative arguments which
maintain that it is wrong for social structures to impede access to that
which they ought to provide: those life-requirements necessary to
existence and a good life.
Marx initially seems to have planned a much more systematic
synthesis between empirical science and philosophy. He hoped to create a
genuinely philosophical science that would supersede the opposition
between natural and human science. ‘To assume one basis for life and one
basis science is as a matter of course a lie’ (Marx, 1975b, 303). Science
presupposes life. The reproduction and meaningful social development of
life presupposes on-going connection with the natural world in forms of
productive relationship which prioritise the satisfaction of both natural
and social life-requirements. The conscious nature of human productive
relationships prove that human beings are not programmed machines but
invent their own social conditions of life. From these three claims it
follows that science, the principled understanding of the universe by
conscious human beings who dwell within it, must ultimately be unified.
This unity cannot be reductive, however, because reductive physicalism
eliminates the human sources of wonder, imagination, and caring that
motivate science in the first place. Instead, the unity, Marx suggests, must
be synthetic and not reductive. The science of which Marx speculates here
would be a complex explanation of how the capacities and values that steer
human action emerge out of productive activity and how they are
furthered or impeded by the particular steering values of a given
productive system. All sound scientific inquiry must link back to the
general conditions of life and what makes it better or worse. The new
science would thus be a science in which normative goals are intrinsic, not
as mere facts as an empirical sociologist would treat them, but as real
values whose progressive development and realization the empirical
understanding of the facts of life can help advance. In this synthesis,
philosophy would be the crucial element since it is only the philosophical
moment of the synthesis that can articulate the value dimension. Values
are not mere artefacts found like minerals or plants, but but are
consciously constructed. The conscious construction is in turn dependent
upon the philosophical understanding of life’s being meaningful. Only in
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such a new science would the “chimerical” relationship between
philosophy and natural science which Marx laments be superseded (Marx
1975b, 303).
Marx never completed this prospective synthesis of empirical
science and philosophy. I will make some general suggestions in the next
section about why such a synthesis ought to become a goal for scientists
and philosophers alike today, and why philosophy alone can play the
leading role in developing it. At this point, however, let us sum up this part
by returning to the Eleventh Thesis and see whether it still reads like the
complete rejection of philosophy it is generally taken to be. I believe that
read in light of the preceding argument an initially unapparent ambiguity
initially appears. Is Marx repudiating philosophy as such in the Eleventh
Thesis, or is he only repudiating the timeless and disengaged philosophy
preached by Bauer and others? The subsequent work of Marx does not
resolve the ambiguity. As his work turns to the critique of political
economy he often draws analogies between his work and the methods of
the natural sciences (Marx 1986, 21). At the same time, the ‘prescientific’
normative ideas of alienation and truly human life-activity never disappear
from his work, and are central to the Grundrisse and key arguments in
Capital, especially his discussion of the labour process (Marx 1986, 173175). I have no intention here of solving the ambiguity or insisting, as
Althusser did, on a fundamental ‘epistemological break’ in Marx’s work, or
in answering that charge, as others have already done (Althusser 1997, 4986; Meszaros 1970, 213-253). Instead I want to put the ambiguity to work
in vindicating for the present the idea of philosophical practice central to
Marx’s own understanding of philosophy in 1843 and 1844.
When Marx says that philosophers have only interpreted the world,
he is clearly rejecting the sort of philosophy practiced by Bruno Bauer. The
rejection of philosophy as relentless negative critique of the present,
undertaken from a purportedly timeless perspective claimed (but not
defended) by the critic, does not entail, however, the rejection of a
philosophy of the future whose relationship to the present is concretely
situated criticism of the specific ways in which it impedes the free
realization of human life-capabilities. That sort of philosophy does not
simply interpret the world, but nor does it trust the world’s transformation
to inexorable historical forces or classes steered by their positional
interests within a given social structure. Instead, philosophy as engaged
critique of the present argues against ruling system values on the basis of
deeper values synthesised by the philosophical understanding of the selfcreative processes at the foundation of historical change. By developing an
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account of universal values as emergent from the facts of human life, this
situated, timely, and critical philosophy provides something that no other
discipline can: an understanding of values as neither mere natural facts
(about genetically regulated behaviour, for example) nor historical facts
(functional rules necessary for social reproduction) nor laws imposed by
transcendent divinity (‘take it or leave it’ divine commands), but as goals
that emerge in historical development whose full realization depends upon
the conscious, collective construction of a future society in which
contemporary life-crises have been resolved.
Natural and social sciences would have a central role to play
because they have immensely enriched our understanding of the natural
and social frames within which human beings must act. Knowledge of
these frames, in addition to being intrinsic epistemic goods, also
contributes to a positive knowledge of human freedom by disclosing the
space in which conscious human action and the values that steer it can
make a difference to the future development of society. Knowledge of the
frames of action does not, however, entail any conclusions about how we
ought to act within them. The frames are the facts that await uptake in the
new philosophical synthesis Marx proposed but did not develop. To
actually develop that synthesis would require real collaboration and
collective efforts, efforts which cannot be accomplished in a single paper.
My focus in conclusion, therefore, will be on the role philosophy can play in
such a synthesis, and why assuming that sort of role is key to the return of
philosophy to the position of public prominence it ought to have.
For a New Critical Public Philosophy
The key to the solution of contemporary life-crises is the development of a
new philosophical synthesis of foundational human values out of the facts
of life in its natural and social dimensions. On this basis the universal
structure of contemporary social problems can be coherently understood
as a unified crisis of life-value across the natural and social dimensions of
being alive. An essential moment of this synthesis is as rich an empirical
understanding as it is possible to construct of the different concrete ways
in which this unified crisis manifests itself. Biochemistry, atmospheric
science, ecology, zoology, and oceanography are all essential to
understanding what it means to say that there is a crisis of the natural
conditions of life-support. Critical forms of empirical sociology, economics,
history, and political science are essential to understanding the concrete
effects of natural and social life-crisis on differently situated groups of
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people. The ‘lie’ implicit in establishing different bases for life and science
in effect means that the ultimate warrant of science, natural or social, is not
to control nature in the service of a particular structure of ruling values
and its attendant asymmetries of wealth, power, knowledge, and status,
but to generate the practical knowledge necessary to improve lifeconditions for each and all who live. This goal, however, cannot be a goal
generated by empirical science itself. Empirical science, in order to
accumulate knowledge, must focus on its object and its object does not
include ‘value’ in the normative sense required as the foundation of the
solution to life crisis. Without philosophy the empirical disciplines risk
‘sinking into empirical-technical minutiae,’ with no value-ground, as
Horkheimer worried (Horkheimer 1993, 14). Marx takes us some of the
way to the goal in so far as his early struggles with and against philosophy
disclose the method by which values may be synthesised from the facts of
natural and social life. Yet Marx himself does not go far enough.
In his early struggles with and against philosophy Marx assumes a
normative understanding of values as universal steering goals leading the
struggle for a free and life-supportive society, but he never defines value as
such. In his later political economic work value is defined in a one-sided
way as exclusively materialised labour-time. That definition is inadequate
to the deep normative arguments developed in his early work. These
arguments were not essentially political economy, but focussed on the
sorts of goals that political economy ought to serve. Yet Marx does at least
imply the required understanding of value in so far as he implies that life is
the fundamental condition of there being any value at all. This conclusion
is implied in his claim that productive life is life-engendering life, and its
converse, that there is a deep normative contradiction involved where,
instead of engendering life, productive activity threatens or destroys it.
Still, implying a conclusion and drawing a conclusion are logically distinct.
Hence, in order to explicate the conception of value required by the new
philosophical synthesis I am proposing, we need to go beyond Marx.
If we think of values in terms of the bases of motivation of an
agent’s (individual or collective) action, and keep in mind the obvious, that
action requires life, then the satisfaction of the natural and social
requirements of being alive as an agent are universal conditions of any
action at all. From the perspective that understands life and the
satisfaction of life’s requirements as universal preconditions of activity, a
value is ‘that in the object which makes it an object of care and concern for
a living subject.’ This definition applies across the range of things that can
have value and the different ways in which things can be valued. The
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reason why people care about food is because it has nutritional value, the
reason why people care about education is because it has cognitive value
(it is the only way in which the intellectual capabilities of the human brain
can be developed); the reason why people care about politics is because it
has social value in so far as its outcomes determine the legal frames within
which active life must be led.
In general we can say that the overall goodness or badness of a
society can be determined by reference to the degree to which its
institutions and practices satisfy the natural and social life-requirements of
its citizens being able to live as free, conscious agents whose concrete lifeexpressions contribute, via a virtuous circle, to the ability of other citizens
to live as free, conscious agents. To the extent that these requirements are
satisfied, citizens’ lives increase in what McMurtry calls ‘life-value.’ Lifevalue is realized both in the satisfaction of natural and social liferequirements and the enjoyed expression of the human capabilities to
sense and feel, think and act, in ways which do not unsustainably destroy
the natural field of life-support or depend upon the exploitation and
oppression of others for their expression and enjoyment (McMurtry 2008).
Life-value is neither an abstraction nor a timeless ideal. It can always be
determined by reference to the life-requirements that given societies
satisfy and do not satisfy, and by the range and depth of the meaningful
human capabilities their satisfaction enables and their deprivation
disables.
A complete understanding of life-value requires a rich
understanding of human life-requirements and human capabilities as well
as the natural and social frames within which we must live. Empirical
natural and social science thus play an indispensible role in understanding
what these frames are and what their impact on existing and future human
life is and will be. In order to create a society in which life-value is
maximised for each and all, we need to understand the carrying capacity of
the natural world, sustainable levels of resource extraction, how to create
production processes which minimise toxic pollution, and how to produce
clean energy at quantities sufficient for lives of maximum life-value but not
beyond the carrying capacity of the natural life-support system. This
synthesis also requires the contributions of empirical social science, and
especially, as Marx argued, history. Those in positions of privilege need to
hear, understand, and internalise the different experiences of exploitation
and oppression of all the different subaltern groups. Concrete political
strategies for life-grounded change cannot be inferred deductively from
the general principle of life-value maximization, but can only be advanced
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democratically in movements whose goals are emergent expressions of all
subaltern groups experiences and ideas for change
In this way, the philosophically articulated idea of life-value forms
the basis of a new synthesis of philosophy and empirical science. The
unifying goal would be the full realization of life-value posited as the
ought-to-become of the future. This ought-to-become is not a dogmatic and
arbitrary stipulation of goal, but rather an empirically justified argument
about the natural and social conditions for a life-coherent development of
the human capabilities that make life worth living. Fundamental social
change in the direction of more life-valuable forms of social organization is
inconceivable in the absence of society-wide repudiation of the rule of
money-value accumulation in favour of life-value maximization for each
and all. Such a change in values must be empirically defensible. The
required empirical defence can only be constructed with information
concerning biological and social life-requirements and the capacity of
natural and social worlds to satisfy them. Together, philosophy and
empirical science united in the synthesis here proposed are capable of
motivating change by disclosing the ‘material irrationality’ of the ruling
value-system. By material irrationality, I mean that a set of ruling social
values, if adhered to consistently over the long term, will undermine the
life-support systems, natural or social, which even the ruling system values
presuppose. In the contemporary world, faced with the environmental,
economic, and political crises noted in the introduction, philosophy can
best put itself at the service of history by consistently and systematically
exposing and confronting people with the material irrationality of the
prevailing value system.
As it was in Marx’s time, so too in ours, the ruling value system
continues to judge value in terms of money value, and affirms or
repudiates collective and individual projects according to the likelihood of
their returning profit to those that invest their time in them. As McMurtry
argues, from within this system of value, ‘nothing which is not an atomic
money sum or priced commodity ... can register in this paradigm=s terms
of reference, no shared life-good can exist for it’ (McMurtry 2002, 134). Of
course, this is not the only set of values at work. It is the socially dominant
system, however, in so far as it is disseminated through the media,
dominates culturally approved symbols of success, guides economic
enterprises, and shapes government policy across the globe. Yet the
growth of money value which this ruling value system demands is
materially unsustainable. It is impossible, on a finite globe, for growing
numbers of people to demand ever higher output and thus make ever
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rising energy demands without finally causing a global collapse of the lifesupport system of the natural world. What John Gray astutely remarks in
relation to the looming oil crisis has general significance for any energy
source; ‘technology cannot repeal the laws of thermodynamics... When the
energy costs of extracting oil exceed the energy thereby produced, no price
can make the process profitable ... It is a consequence of the universal law
of entropy’ (Gray 2003, 67). Yet the ruling value system does in fact
demand ever higher ‘standards of living’ as measured by market
commodities consumed, and thus ever more energy to drive production.
An empirically informed and life-grounded critical philosophical synthesis
is the only intellectual basis which can expose the material irrationality of
this system. Disclosing this material irrationality is, in turn, the
precondition for a new opening toward a future that pursues the
realization of different values by different means. This openness is not a
contentless existential horizon, but a concrete opening for human action to
change the world on the basis of new values generated from the empirical
and rational demonstration of the material irrationality of the ruling value
system. If philosophy remains institutionally marginalized and publically
silenced then the world will lose its systematic capacity for self-criticism
and conscious value transformation at just the point in history when it
most needs philosophy’s unique contribution.
These are not esoteric arguments. The need for a fundamentally
different structure of ruling values is increasingly obvious because the
evidence that speaks against the sustainability and justice of the present
world order is more and more difficult to rationally deny. It is evidenced
by the growing recognition across societies of the ecological
unsustainability of capitalist economic practices, of the inexcusable waste
of the lives of the two billion people who are forced to subsist on two
dollars a day, by the moral insanity of armed conflicts that do nothing but
set the stage for revenge and more killing, of the vacuity of consumer
culture and the anaesthetizing effects of mass entertainment, of the
mindless subservience demanded of most workers, and of the empty shell
of democracy that ignores the considered demands and life-requirements
of majorities. Far from being ‘only’ an interpretation, the philosophical
practice of empirically informed social critique is the precondition of any
intelligent and emancipatory social change that might emerge from these
as yet disparate insights into the real structure of life-crisis today.
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